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Imagine a group of geese flying across the sky. One goose is in front, and the others 
successively further behind on each side in a V-formation. Many presume that the front 
bird is the leader, a distinctive goose who has special characteristics that it uses to keep 
the other geese in line. A presumption that collective organization like the V-formation 
depends on a leader in the sense just described, that is, on a hierarchical organization, 
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seems deeply engrained in human thought. This hierarchical image of a collective process 
is depicted in Figure 1A. 
Now imagine a group of local representatives to a national constitutional convention. 
Each representative harbors, to one degree or another, a conviction that each one is the 
best judge of the potentials and needs of the constituency it represents; each 
representative also fears it will be disadvantaged by any centralized authority and thus 
prefers untrammeled self-determination. This image of a collective process is depicted in 
Figure 1B. An inclination to resist hierarchical organization is perhaps as ingrained in 
humans as is the presumption that such hierarchy must exist.  
In this essay, I aim to unsettle the notion that a hierarchical organization of the sort 
presumed in the case of flying geese (or feared in the case of the constitutional 
convention) is either desirable or inevitable. I also aim to unsettle the idea that the only 
alternative to such a hierarchical organization is a feared or fancied anarchy, in the sense 
of either unbridled “relativism” (Grobstein, 2005b) or completely decentralized 
egalitarianism (cf. Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006). The most common and most successful 
organizations known, those typical of the biological world, are in general neither 
hierarchical nor anarchic but involve instead what I will call distributed interactive 
architectures (Figure 1C). The human brain itself displays a distinctive multilevel 
version, what I will call a bipartite or hybrid (Grobstein, in press) architecture (Figure 
1D), which I will argue provides an exemplary model not only for academic 
multidisciplinary work but for human social organization in a wide variety of 
circumstances.  
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Figure 1. Schematic information flow architectures. Dots are processing elements; arrows 
show the patterns of information flow between them; boxes demarcate the structures from 
the surroundings. “Group Product” is the outcome of the collective activity of the 
elements that interact directly with the surroundings. Part A shows hierarchical 
organization, Part B shows anarchic organization, Part C shows distributed interactive 
organization, and Part D shows a bipartite or hybrid distributed interactive organization, 
 including the fuschia dot at the top.  
(Adapted from http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/local/scisoc/leadership04/leadership.html) 
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In making this argument, I will draw not only on biological, neurobiological, and 
computer modeling observations but also on my own experiences in the social arena, 
particularly 7 years as founding director of the multidisciplinary Center for Science in 
Society at Bryn Mawr College, USA. The Center was founded to promote “the broad 
conversations . . . which are essential to continuing exploration of . . . the natural world 
and humanity’s place in it” (Center for Science in Society, n.d.; Dalke, Grobstein, & 
McCormack, 2006a, 2006b). As such, the Center has served as a laboratory for exploring, 
developing, and testing ways of encouraging and supporting broad conversations, and 
assessing their usefulness. I offer this essay in the same spirit. If multidisciplinary work is 
meaningful in its own right, a minimum requirement is to show that disparate 
perspectives can be productively brought together to suggest ways of understanding that 
would be less likely to evolve from particular disciplinary perspectives. Beyond this, it 
needs to be demonstrated that such understandings are in turn not only relevant to a wide 
array of both disciplinary and practical human problems but also create new directions, 
questions, and problems worth further exploration. It also needs to be demonstrated that 
interdisciplinary conversations are not only achievable but can be sustained. I hope 
readers will engage with this essay not only in terms of its particular arguments about 
academic and social organization but also viewing it as a sample of what interdisciplinary 
work makes possible and hence its associated potentials and problems. 
1. Distributed Interactive Architectures  
A major general insight of the twentieth-century and early twentyfirst-century science, 
itself the product of interdisciplinary work including computer modeling, is that a highly 
adaptive collective organization can result from interactions among entities none of 
which function as a leader (Dalke, Cassidy, Grobstein, & Blank, 2007; Grobstein, in 
press; Johnson, 2001; Keller, 2003; Resnick, 1994; Serendip, n.d.). Flocking behaviors in 
birds and other organisms can be accounted for in terms of interactions among 
individuals all of whom are equivalent and follow the same internal instructions (cf. 
Wilensky, 1998). The same is true of, for example, task allocation in ant colonies (cf. 
Cyckowski & Grobstein, 2006) and synchronization of flashing displays in some species 
of fireflies (Strogatz, 2003). Humans are by no means unusual in this regard. The “wave” 
displayed by audiences at many sporting events reflects a collective order created by 
individuals all following the same internal instructions (get up after people to your left 
get up, then sit down). There are a variety of more ordinary social and economic 
phenomena where collective organization seems to have a similar “emergent” character 
(Gladwell, 2000; cf. Emergent Systems Working Group, 2004). Indeed, Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand,” the core of the capitalist economic theory of market exchange, is 
appropriately thought of as an expression of coordinated collective behavior in the 
absence of a leader. 
What is particularly germane in the present context is that “leaderless” organization, 
reflecting distributed interactive architectures, seems to be very much the norm rather 
than the exception in biological systems generally, at all levels of organization from the 
social to the molecular. DNA, to take one example, is increasingly understood to be not 
the “organizer” or “blueprint” of living organisms but rather a particular molecular array 
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that interacts with a variety of other molecular arrays in such a way that particular 
organisms “emerge.” Similarly, neither the heart nor the brain is the “leader” of a 
multicellular organism like a human; instead each of them interacts with each other and a 
variety of other entities to yield the phenomenon we call life (Grobstein, 1988). The same 
holds for the brain itself; it consists of a larger number of interacting regions from which 
emerges, for example, the picture we see when we look at the world and, more generally, 
consciousness (Grobstein, 2003a, 2005c, in press).  
These examples differ from the simpler forms of collective order involved in flocking, 
ant colonies, and the like, in that the interacting elements are heterogeneous rather than 
indistinguishable. At the same time, they share with them the essential characteristics of 
distributed interactive architectures (Figure 1C): 
(a) No element is in control; instead each influences and, in turn, is influenced by other 
elements. Causal relationships are bi-directional rather than one way. 
(b) No element has complete information about the functioning of the assembly as a 
whole; instead each element acts in terms of partial information and its own organization, 
sharing information about its own activity with the other elements. 
(c) No element represents an unchallengeable objective for the assembly as a whole; 
instead the appearance of an overall objective exists only for an observer and reflects 
simply the semi-independent activities of the elements as modified by their patterns of 
information sharing.  
The characteristic that distinguishes these systems from anarchistic ones (Figure 1B) is 
not the presence or absence of a leader but rather the extensive and reciprocal 
interconnections that distinctively characterize them. That distributed interactive 
architectures, rather than hierarchical organization, is the norm in the biological world 
raises some very interesting questions about why humans tend to presume that 
organization depends on a leader. Perhaps more importantly, it suggests that the 
presumption needs serious reexamination (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006; Surowiecki, 
2004). Biological systems are themselves the product of evolution, of billions of years of 
trial and error, in which more effective organizations persist while less effective ones 
disappear. It is hard to escape the conclusion from biology that by and large systems 
involving distributed interactive architectures work better than hierarchical ones, at least 
in the kinds of continually, somewhat unpredictably changing environments in which 
evolution has been occurring.  
2. Bipartite or Hybrid Architectures Having Story Tellers  
A significant and, in evolutionary terms, apparently quite recent variant of distributed 
interactive architectures is exemplified by the human brain (and probably that of most 
mammals). As illustrated in the lower part of Figure 2, the human nervous system can be 
usefully thought of, for the most part, as consisting of a large number of relatively 
specialized modules (Fodor, 1983; Minsky, 1986) that interact with the outside world and 
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display some significant collective coordination due to the kind of information sharing 
that characterizes distributed interactive architectures in general. Like other instances of 
such organizations, the assembly appears to an external observer to have “objectives,” 
without in fact having any such thing explicitly represented in any single element of the 
assembly, each of which functions in terms of local information and organization.  
There is, of course, a potential disjunction between such a characterization of the human 
brain and the experiences one has of a distinctive and unitary self who is both coherent 
and has objectives. Some people are more aware of their internal multiplicity--what 
Marvin Minsky termed “the society of mind” (Minsky, 1986), some are less so. 
Regardless, it is probably the sense of a more or less coherent self, who is (or is supposed 
to be) “in charge” of what we do and expects it to be done in line with its own 
“objectives” that inclines us to presume hierarchical organizations involving leaders as 
the norm.  
Among the reasons for our misleading experiences with ourselves is that the human brain 
includes, in addition to an array of interacting specialized modules that function largely 
without our awareness of them, a second architectural layer (probably the neocortex, 
upper part of Figure 2) that appears to have been enabled by evolution to achieve a single, 
coherent representation of the collective entity that consists of itself and the rest of the 
nervous system. This representation constitutes one’s conscious experience, one’s 
description of oneself, and one’s relation to the world, including one’s sense of objectives 
and of alternatives that might be pursued to achieve them (Grobstein 2003a, 2005c, in 
press).  
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Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the bipartite illustration of the human brain. The upper 
and lower boxes represent the unconscious and conscious (the “story teller”) respectively, 
with the former consisting of a number of specialized discrete modules that interact with 
the outside world (arrows at the bottom of the figure). Additional arrows show the  
general patterns of information flow within the brain.  
(Adapted from http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/bb/bipartitebrain) 
I will, in the following, refer to this representation as a story, to emphasize that it is 
“made up” to account for observations of oneself and one’s relations to other things, 
rather than being a definitive description of either oneself or of things outside oneself 
(Grobstein, 2003a, 2005c, in press). Hence it is always subject to challenge and revision. 
I will refer to the elaborator of that story, from the information it gets from other elements 
of the society of mind, as the story teller. The resulting bipartite organization, with our 
conscious experience consisting only of stories, makes us largely unaware of the 
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collective that gives rise to our own behavior and to our experiences both of ourselves 
and of the world around us, and also makes us inclined to attribute hierarchical 
organization not only to ourselves but to other things as well. The human brain is actually 
a special kind of interactive distributed system--one that includes an element specialized 
to try and achieve global coherence and elaborate at least transient global objectives.  
In fact, as we experience to varying degrees, our conscious selves are rarely “in control”--
to the extent they think they are (cf. Kolata, 2007). Furthermore, they are, in many 
circumstances, a less trustworthy guide to adaptive behavior than is the unconscious 
community with which they interact (cf. Gladwell, 2005). To put it differently, the story 
telling part of the brain does not, despite our perceptions, actually function as a 
hierarchical leader. It is instead simply an additional specialized element of a distributed 
interactive architecture, with our behavior reflecting sometimes our conscious objectives, 
sometimes the outputs of the differently specialized diverse elements that make up the 
brain, and most often interactions among them. 
The distinctive specialization of the story teller follows from its architectural relations to 
the rest of the brain. As illustrated in Figure 1D, the story telling element (the fuschia 
colored dot at the top does not have any direct connection with the outside world. It 
receives information about things outside the nervous system (i.e., the rest of the body 
and the external world) only from other elements of the nervous system and acts on 
things outside the nervous system only through them. It is, in this architectural sense (and 
this architectural sense alone), an upper level element, strictly dependent on the other 
elements for interactions with things outside the nervous system. While other elements 
interact with and are modified by interactions with things outside, the story teller interacts 
with and is modified only by interactions with things inside the nervous system.  
The effective function of the fuschia dot (a neologism that I shall use in the following to 
refer to the story-telling layer of hybrid architectures, whether occurring in the brain or 
elsewhere) thus depends fundamentally on receiving continuous and convergent 
information from an unusually wide array of the other elements of the society of mind, 
reporting not only their activities but the analyses they have made of the local 
information they have. These constitute feelings, intuition, emotions, and the like. It is 
from these inputs that the fuschia dot creates its stories--coherent ways of making sense 
of the cacophony of signals it gets from the other elements of the society of mind. Just as 
the lower level elements work to make sense of aspects of the body and world to achieve 
local objectives, so does the story teller work to make sense of the array of signals it gets 
from the society of mind in terms of global objectives it synthesizes from the reports it 
gets about the success and failures of other elements.  
It is the existence of this upper level story generating capability, in the bipartite 
architecture, that gives the human brain capacities that extend beyond those of simpler 
distributed interactive architectures. The story is at any given time, and with varying 
degrees of consensus, a representation of the assembly as a whole, of a global objective 
that can in turn be used to assess the performance of the assembly as a whole. The story, 
redistributed through the assembly, is also a way to suggest modifications in the 
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performance of parts, based on a wider array of information than is available at any given 
time to any given part. Most importantly, perhaps, the story is phrased in more abstract 
and general terms that allow for its ready modification by imagining simple “what if?” 
conditions. The upshot is that the story becomes itself a significant influence on the 
behavior of an organism, as does the capability to conceive and try out things that have 
not yet existed. The brain is an interactive distributed system, but one with a specialized 
element that creates broad pictures of itself and the world not only as they have been 
experienced but also as they might conceivably be, and does so in terms of a small 
number of more or less consistent global understandings rather than a large number of 
potentially competing local ones. The relatively small number of interacting features and 
their easy recombination gives the fuschia dot a distinctive ability to conceive new 
possibilities.  
Such a system has superficial similarities to a hierarchical system (compare Figures 1A 
and 1D), but is in fact quite different. The story teller or fuschia dot has no more inherent 
power or authority than the rest of the elements of the community of mind. Its “upper 
level” character is entirely an architectural feature; it is a generalist whose capabilities 
depend on the wide array of inputs it gets from more specialized systems and whose 
effectiveness depends entirely on its ability to create from them stories that they can 
accept and work with. Its stories are neither inevitable nor “true” (Grobstein, 2004a, 
2005a, in press), being instead constantly subject to revision based on the information it 
receives from other elements. The stories provide a mechanism to improve coordination 
within the community of mind as a whole and, perhaps even more importantly, have the 
potential to alter the organization and performance of the other elements, so as to create 
behaviors that would not otherwise exist. The organization is neither anarchic nor that of 
a hierarchy with a leader, nor is it a fully distributed system lacking any localized 
representation of the system as a whole. Instead it is a hybrid--a distributed system with 
specialized elements including ones distinctively specialized to create and revise 
candidate stories for the assembly as a whole. It is an architecture within which there is 
continuing report and negotiation, with some elements focused on more local tasks and 
associated processes of information gathering, synthesis, evaluation, and creation related 
to them, and others (the fuschia dots) on similar tasks of information gathering, synthesis, 
evaluation, and creation operating over wider terrains. 
Such bipartite or hybrid architectures, just like the broader category of distributed 
interactive systems of which they are a subset, are a product of evolution, suggesting that 
they too work better than hierarchical architectures, at least in continually changing, 
somewhat unpredictable environments. This raises the question of whether they might not 
work better in human social contexts as well.  
3. From the Brain to Social Organization: Interdisciplinary 
Conversation and Academic Structures  
It is no coincidence that the picture of brain architecture described in the preceding 
section emerged in my own brain during a period when I was engaged in active 
exploration of not only the brain and computer models of emergence but also of academic 
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structures that would provide greater support and encouragement for interdisciplinary 
conversations. In dealing with emergent systems, with the brain, and with academic 
structures, I could not help but notice a similar need to find ways to think in one 
framework about both local and global processing (cf. Burke & Grobstein, 2003). 
Anyone having experience with modern academic institutions will recognize their 
tendency to organize around disciplines, that is, around focused and specialized 
engagement with relatively narrow processes of information gathering, synthesis, 
evaluation, and creation--and also to resist, both intellectually and politically, equally 
significant efforts to work and make common cause over broader terrains. The tensions 
are frequently expressed in terms not unlike those used in constitutional conventions, 
substituting disciplines for “states rights” and interdisciplinary for “federalism” 
(Grobstein, 2003c).  
My own instincts as a scientist and intellectual have always been otherwise (Grobstein, 
2007, in press), and it was for this reason that I became involved in the creation of the 
interdisciplinary Center for Science in Society. In so doing, I found myself resisting 
giving an announced mission for the Center more specific than “to facilitate broad 
conversations . . . essential to continuing explorations of . . . the natural world and 
humanity’s place in it,” despite expressions of concern that such a statement was too 
diffused to be either understood or meaningful. Whatever the problems, the Center 
evolved successfully (Dalke, Grobstein, & McCormack, 2006a, 2006b), perhaps in ways 
that it might not otherwise have done. That in turn contributed to an emerging recognition 
that what I was interested in was a victory for neither disciplinarity nor interdisciplinarity, 
but rather a way to productively associate the two.  
The notions of story, the fuschia dot, story sharing, and conversations seem to me to 
provide a valuable key to associating disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity. What is in 
academia less understood than it perhaps ought to be is that, in the last analysis, all 
disciplines are components of a common process of inquiry, and all share what are, at the 
deepest level, common practices not only of observing but also of story telling, story 
sharing, and story revising. Viewed in this light, it would seem obvious that 
interdisciplinary work can and should be valued in the academy. That it is less so than it 
might be relates, as I have come to believe, to architectural challenges, not unlike those 
influencing the evolution of the bipartite brain.  
It is reasonable to think of disciplines as analogous to the components of the society of 
mind that are most directly in contact with the outside world, the specialized entities that 
are indeed often in the best position to evaluate the products and needs of their own 
activities in terms of their own experiences. One might in practice, as well as in principle, 
leave it to these entities and the interactions among them (as in Figure 1C) to evolve what 
is, at any given time, the state of the common practice of inquiry--both the “group 
product” and the group objectives. 
In practice, though, this leads to problems, some obvious and others perhaps less so. The 
most obvious problems relate to disciplinary rivalry, which in turn directly reflects the 
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absence of any mechanism to effectively adjudicate resource allotment in terms of a 
shared group objective. The upshot is that the disciplines, particularly in times of limited 
resources, come to find themselves in competition with one another with no shared basis 
for evaluation of respective contributions and needs. In such an environment, an obvious 
way for a discipline to be more successful is to denigrate the value of the work of other 
disciplines. This tendency is exacerbated by a genuine need of the disciplines to 
acculturate practitioners in the standards of the respective disciplinary communities. In 
times of stress, this is often done in a way that conveys, explicitly or implicitly, that those 
standards provide a unique and privileged access to understanding and truth, or the stories 
of the particular discipline are superior to those of any other. The result is a tendency for 
the participants of a discipline to believe that their own ways of understanding are rooted 
in clear observations and appropriate interpretations of those observations, while those of 
other disciplines are “just stories” and so can be ignored. 
It is particularly at this point that the recognition that all understandings are “stories” 
seems to me a point of great significance, not only intellectually but also politically and 
practically. I argued in the previous section that because of the way the brain is 
organized, all understandings are stories (see also Grobstein, in press) in two important 
senses. First, they represent an effort to make sense of observations without being 
precisely sure of exactly what was being observed and to what extent the observations 
were influenced by the observer/story teller. Second, they are inevitably only one of 
multiple possible ways of making sense of the observations and serve primarily not so 
much to understand what is as to conceive what might be, to motivate new questions and 
new observations (see also Dalke & McCormack, 2007). Hence, stories have value 
somewhat independently of the observations that give rise to them. New stories, and 
therefore new possibilities for further exploration, can arise as readily from comparing 
stories against one another as by comparing stories with new observations. The 
justification for interdisciplinary exchange and the distinctive role of the fuschia dot 
relates to the new things that may arise not only from combining distinct sets of 
observations but equally from hearing and contrasting distinct sets of stories. Stories are 
never “just stories”; rather they are, or at least should be, as integral to academic practice, 
to the business of inquiry, as observations, critique, and the other apparatus of intellectual 
activity.  
Learning to think like an economist has little value unless it is accompanied 
by learning how to share the fruits of that analytical approach and enrich its 
insights through conversation with others. Learning to see the world entirely 
through the prism of economics makes it nearly impossible to listen to 
others. (Ross, 2007, Section 1, para. 2)  
The same can, of course, be said for physicists, biologists, literary scholars, and so on. 
Disciplinary focus has demonstrable values but so too does the kinds of broader 
perspectives that depend on exploring the worth of stories other than one’s own. An 
ability to do so, just like disciplinary expertise, requires appropriate commitment and 
experience together with a clear recognition that all understandings, including one’s own 
at any given time, are indeed stories, and hence both valuable and revisable. As an 
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inquirer, one is always playing a contributory role in a larger ongoing process. It is a 
process that inevitably occurs in a continually changing and unpredictable environment--
no matter how clear and compelling the objectives seem at any given time. The fuschia 
dot needs to be particularly aware of this condition.  
A similar argument holds in the arena of the political structures of academia. The 
disciplines have indeed special expertise in their own areas of inquiry--much as the 
delegates to a constitutional convention have in relation to the localities they represent. 
At the same time, there is a need for collective stories of the institution and the 
intellectual enterprise as a whole. These can and should be provided by people whose 
business it is to listen to and contrast the separate activities of the disciplines and create 
new and broader stories from that, which can be tried out in more specific contexts. This, 
rather than being a hierarchical leader, is the role of the fuschia dot, not to adjudicate 
among existing stories but rather to use them to create candidate new stories to be tested 
in the ongoing flow of continual bidirectional exchange. Both intellectually and 
politically, a multi-level distributed interactive architecture like that of the human brain 
can provide advantages in academic contexts missing in either hierarchical, anarchic, or 
single-layer distributed structures.  
For this role, people are needed who have a willingness and inclination to acknowledge, 
rather than to challenge, the distinctive roles that different elements play in effective 
interactive systems and the value of the different stories they tell. To be both effective 
and sustained, interdisciplinary conversation depends on the existence of people whose 
personal satisfaction derives from hearing a wide-ranging array of stories, not to choose 
one among them but rather to create from the collection of them new and broader stories 
that in turn are meaningful for the original story tellers. In this sense, the fuschia dot 
facilitates interdisciplinary conversation because of a personal commitment not only to 
interdisciplinary conversation but to a more synthetic “transdisciplinarity” (Nicolescu, 
2007). 
This, in turn, raises some interesting challenges for the academic community, which 
remains for the most part nearly exclusively committed to the kinds of disciplinary 
training that have proven effective for intellectual work in the past. Fuschia dots or 
transdisciplinarians have been, for the most part, born rather than made, and have had to 
stubbornly persist in their activities against substantial discouragement in both academic 
training and advancement (cf. Grobstein, 1991). This may not be the optimal arrangement 
for the continuing evolution of the academic enterprise. 
Institutional structures are changing in a way that is more encouraging and supportive of 
interdisciplinary conversation; the existence and ongoing development of the Center for 
Science in Society is one line of evidence for that (see also Building the Scientific Mind, 
2007; National Institutes of Health, 2004; National Science Foundation, 2007; SENCER, 
n.d.). Whether the encouragement of interdisciplinary conversation around shared 
objectives agreed upon in advance will prove to be a sufficient mechanism to generate the 
needed increased numbers of fuschia dot and so transform a single layer distributed 
system into a genuinely multilayered hybrid system remains to be seen.  
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I think what will be needed is actually a more thorough-going reconsideration of the 
academic enterprise so as to encourage and support those whose inclinations are to make 
a career of listening to diverse stories in order to generate new ones and to provide them 
with the relevant exposure and training (cf. Szostak, 2007). The objective is not at all to 
eliminate disciplines but rather to acknowledge an equivalent need for 
transdisciplinarians, people whose inclination and preparation fit them to the task of 
promoting the much needed new adaptations to “unpredictably changing environments” 
and so whose work must necessarily be done at the risk of being for many, at any given 
time, “too diffuse to be either understood or be meaningful.” 
4. From the Brain to Social Organization: Beyond the Academic  
Academic activities and structures may seem like a specialized arena of activity remote 
from day to day life and its challenges, but a persistent conflict between hierarchical and 
decentralized approaches is as real for everyday life as it is for the academic world. Here, 
I describe ways in which the products of multidisciplinary inquiry, in particular the idea 
of a hybrid distributed architecture involving specialized story tellers, may have 
relevance in additional, more practical realms and, in turn, be further developed by such 
applications. My objective is to broaden the concept of interdisciplinarity beyond its 
typical academic realm (see Cook-Sather & Shore, 2007). In so doing, I draw on my 
experiences as an educator, parent, and citizen, as well as co-founder of the Serendip 
Web site, “an expanding forum . . . to support intellectual and social change.”  
Classrooms and families provide familiar examples of tensions between hierarchical and 
anarchistic or fully distributed approaches. From a traditional perspective, teachers and 
parents are in positions of authority, the leaders who organize students and children. As 
any teacher or parent knows, however, the hierarchical structure is to one degree or 
another always under challenge, and experienced teachers and parents eventually come to 
recognize not only that fully hierarchical organization may be impossible to sustain but 
that trying to do so may in fact impede students and children in terms of their individual 
development as responsible and creative entities in their own right (Dalke et al., 2007). 
Single layer fully distributed architectures have their own obvious problems, akin to those 
seen in academia, including lack of grounds for adjudication of competing claims and a 
failure to develop and follow up on initiatives broader than those that occur to individuals 
involved. 
Thinking in terms of a two-level interactive and distributed architecture and the sharing 
of stories offers a new perspective for thinking about classroom organization (Dalke & 
Grobstein, 2007). It repositions students as also teachers, relieving some of the 
resistances inherent in hierarchical structures and giving students more meaningful 
incentive to participate not only in their own education but that of others as well. It also 
repositions the teacher as not an authority but a resource to support individual 
explorations and as the “interdisciplinary” story teller who feeds back activities and 
creations of students as more comprehensive stories that in turn serve as the grist for 
continuing development of individual stories. Taking on the role of the fuschia dot opens 
the teacher to greater engagement with students and to greater creativity on his or her 
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own part. One can make similar arguments regarding the relations between parents and 
children. In both situations, there are gains to be made by choosing two-level interactive 
and distributed architectures over hierarchical, anarchistic, or single layer distributed 
structures, particularly if the teacher/parent sees the task as giving students/children the 
wherewithal to continue creating and revising their own stories in order to deal with a 
continually and somewhat unpredictably changing environment. 
This last point deserves emphasis: a two-level interactive and distributed architecture is 
preferable if one anticipates a “continually and somewhat unpredictably changing 
environment.” Under such circumstances, “[t]he universe has lost its center overnight, 
and woken up to find it has countless centers. So that each one can now be seen as the 
center, or none at all” (Brecht, 1966, p. 86; see also Grobstein, 2004a). While not 
everyone is, or should be, equipped by background or inclination to function as a fuschia 
dot, that opportunity should be available to anyone who aspires to it. The benefits of a 
two-level distributed organization should be available to and understood by all. 
Biological evolution occurring over millions of years has discovered a form of 
organization appropriate for ongoing change, one giving individuals the capability to 
recognize that in a world of no fixed centers they and/or others are themselves capable of 
becoming one. Human cultural evolution has been working for tens of thousands of years 
at the most and has perhaps yet to recognize that stasis and stability is ephemeral, and that 
humans have the wherewithal to move beyond it (Grobstein, 2004a, in press). Perhaps it 
is time, not only in education and childrearing, to bring culture more into line with our 
biological potentials? 
The Serendip Web site is an exploration of the possibility of bringing about such cultural 
change, on a national and world-wide scale. As “a gathering site for people who suspect 
that life’s instructions are always ambiguous and incomplete” (Serendip, n.d.), materials 
on Serendip are explicitly non-authoritative, providing not answers but opportunities for 
people to make use of other peoples’ stories to further develop their own--and to leave 
their own stories for other people to make use of in their own development. It is a place 
for engaged conversation, for story sharing, on the presumption that it is the business of 
every individual not to get it right but rather to engage in an ongoing individual and 
collective process of “getting it less wrong” (Grobstein, 2006) and “finding ways to tell 
our collective human story from which no one feels estranged” (Grobstein, 2001).  
In this context too my experiences suggest that an environment that supports wide 
participation in a decentralized system is necessary for productive social organization but 
not sufficient. Yes, “if we can see friends (and students as friends) as far more than 
ourselves, we may be taking a step necessary to the improvement of education, and the 
civic condition itself” (Burns, 2005). But in the virtual world, as elsewhere, creating and 
sustaining productive communities of friends depends on more than a willingness to 
allow it to happen; it depends as well on an inclination and ability of at least some friends 
to take on the function of fuschia dots, both to instantiate an arena within which people 
can value and effectively learn from each other and to notice and give voice to the new 
stories that emerge from such exchange (Grobstein, 2004b, 2004c, 2005d). It requires a 
developed ability not only to listen to the stories of other people but also to guess the 
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observations and interpretations underlying them, to deconstruct them, not to be critical 
but to abstract from them aspects that can be productively joined with aspects of other 
stories to create new ones.  
5. Testing the Ideas  
The products of inquiry are properly assessed not only in terms of the observations they 
effectively summarize but, at least as importantly, in terms of the new directions they 
suggest for further exploration and the openings they provide to think in new ways in 
which “stories” play an essential role. Refining the concept of a two-level distributed 
architecture poses significant new challenges in neurobiology, evolution biology, and 
computer modeling. Its extension into social organization, however, offers perhaps the 
most demanding arena in which to further refine the story and test its value.  
The tension between the more local and the more global will not go away in culture at 
large or any part of it, but it can in principle be recognized for what it is: a continual and 
valuable mechanism for assuring not simply the testing of existing stories but the 
generation of new and productive stories as well. The key to doing so is to replace the 
concept of a hierarchy directed by a leader with, neither anarchy nor abject relativism, but 
rather with that of a multi-level interactive distributed system, one in which more local 
stories continually and reciprocally interact with more global ones with no a priori 
assumption that either has over-riding precedence--and to recognize that all individuals 
have valuable roles to play in such a system, as much because of their differences as 
because of their similarities (Grobstein, 1989), with some of them focusing more on local 
stories and others on more global ones.  
Could we actually rebuild cultures, not only academic but otherwise, in such a direction 
(Grobstein, 2003b)? What would it take?  
(a) A willingness and ability of individuals to lead lives that are continually in process, 
lives that they shape themselves in terms of values that are also subject to continual 
ongoing interaction with those around them, with an enthusiasm for being individually 
distinctive, not only for one’s own enjoyment but for the benefits it provides others. “The 
more I learn, the more I realize more and more that how I think and feel is different” 
(Grandin, 2005, p. 168). 
(b) A willingness and ability of individuals to tell their own stories as they exist at any 
given time, indeed an enthusiasm for doing so as a contribution to the stories of others 
and the collective human story. 
(c) A willingness and ability of individuals to hear the stories of others, not as alternatives 
or competitors to one’s own but rather as the essential grist for one’s own story revisions 
and the further evolution of collective stories. 
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(d) A willingness and commitment to a permanent process of “getting it less wrong” 
(Grobstein, 2006)--to the evaluation of stories based on their usefulness in the present and 
their potential for generating new stories in the future. 
(e) A socio-political-economic system that discourages hierarchical power relationships 
as well as anarchy and encourages instead continual bidirectional interaction among all 
humans, some contributing more local stories and others synthesizing more global ones.  
(f) Confidence in the evolution of new and productive stories from such interactions that 
provide new solutions to existing problems, which requires a commitment to using the 
past and present to create new futures--rather than trying to shape the present to fit 
lessons learned from the past. 
That may seem, on the face of it, a daunting prescription, one that flies in the face of 
existing social-political-economic norms, and perhaps even in the face of “human nature” 
itself. On the other hand, socio-political-economic norms are themselves collective 
stories and subject to change due to new stories and actions of individuals. My own 
experiences indicate that it is indeed possible to create environments at local levels that 
instantiate two-level interactive distributed architectures and that many individuals find, 
often to their surprise, that they feel more comfortable and productive in such structures. 
The challenge then is to find ways to scale such arrangements up to larger human groups. 
It is a challenge that may necessarily be met only with time, as people gain experience in 
more local settings and so begin expecting similar organization at larger scales. 
As for “human nature”, a principal theme of this essay is that there is not one, at least not 
when looking from a sufficiently broad perspective. “I am, and I can think, therefore I 
can change who I am” (Grobstein, 2004a) and also change things around me as well. Yes, 
we all start with certain understandings, preferences, biases, and the like (disciplinary or 
otherwise), including perhaps a wish for something stable and certain on which we can 
build our lives. But we are also story tellers (see Grobstein, 2007; Rorty, 1999), and that 
gives us the capacity to conceive what has not yet been and, potentially, to bring it into 
existence. If nothing else, I hope this essay serves to remind all readers that that capacity 
is built into their brains and can be used by everyone to create “less wrong” cultures, both 
small and large, reconfigured around those capabilities. If it actually led to more wide-
spread efforts to test the value of trying to implement multi-level distributed systems at 
all scales, so much the better. 
6. Epilogue 
This essay is meant to be a sample of what interdisciplinary work makes possible and 
hence its associated potentials and problems. The essay is indeed a product of 
multidisciplinary work, one that draws on observations and stories deriving from 
explorations touching on a variety of disciplinary grounds. It reflects an attempt to 
construct from them a broader story--that of the significance of a two-level distributed 
architecture and the role of story telling in it--that might not have emerged from any one. 
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The broader story is of potential relevance to all disciplines and raises significant new 
questions in its own right.  
What of the problems? Is the story told here “too diffuse to be either understood or 
meaningful”? More importantly, is that an inevitable hazard of interdisciplinary work? In 
some ways, I think the answer to the more general question is clearly, Yes. An important 
and valuable characteristic of disciplinary organization is the ease of productive 
interactions within a community of explorers who share a common sense of the current 
state of understanding, of the methods by which new understandings can be achieved, and 
of the accessible questions at any given time. Interdisciplinary work, particularly of the 
transdisciplinary kind exemplified here, does not start with a sense of accessible 
questions but rather with a commitment to the notion that understandings, whatever their 
origins, are always incomplete and that the task is to recognize and make productive use 
of that incompleteness by noticing similar patterns across an array of largely independent 
lines of inquiry. Work of this kind is as much about creating new questions and 
associated new lines of exploration as it is about finding answers. So the risk of 
diffuseness, of creating stories that are neither understandable nor meaningful to others is 
very real. To the extent disciplines overlook the incompleteness inherent in their own 
perspectives, the results of transdisciplinary work may not appear meaningful within 
them. 
There is also the risk of inadequate understanding of the disciplinary stories that one uses 
to detect broader patterns and also the risk of reading those stories through the lens of 
one’s own preoccupations. How completely have I mastered the understandings of any of 
the disciplines on which I draw? Is my story of the bipartite brain actually a disciplinary 
story, or an idiosyncratic reading of research on the brain conditioned by other concerns? 
The answer to the first question is, of course, not completely at all. As to the second 
question, my characterization of brain organization is indeed an idiosyncratic story and 
unquestionably reflects influences other than those obtained within a disciplinary context. 
One cannot avoid either risk in work of this kind. 
But none of these difficulties is unique to interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary work. 
These are occupational hazards of inquiry of any kind, including that conducted within 
disciplines. Moreover, there is a close parallel between the hazards of interdisciplinary 
and transdisciplinary work and the hazards the neocortex faces all the time in translating 
the cacophony of information it gets from our unconscious society of mind into coherent 
stories. There is a close parallel in the potential benefits as well. We create stories in an 
effort to generate coherence, to improve coordination at existing tasks, and, at least as 
importantly, to allow us to conceive new possibilities, ways of thinking that open new 
avenues of existence and exploration. The price we pay is an acknowledgement that there 
is no right way (yes, at any given time, there is a large numbers of equally good stories), 
but we gain in return the satisfaction of not only discovering but creating and recreating 
things not previously conceived (Grobstein, 2007, in press). 
Yes, of course, there are problems in interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary inquiry, as 
there are in any other kind. They are the risks inherent to all inquiry, perhaps writ clearer 
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and larger. One never knows with certainty that a particular line of exploration will be 
fruitful, even in a disciplinary context. The ultimate significance in interdisciplinary and 
transdisciplinary research, as in disciplinary research, is the significance the work proves 
to have in advancing future explorations, both by oneself and by others.  
Meanwhile, I hope this essay has at least challenged the reader to acknowledge the 
potential value of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research, of using what is 
currently understood and not understood to ask what new things can be conceived--doing 
so on whatever scales seem useful. Such inquiries may or may not yield answers to 
existing questions. They derive not from a commitment to solve any particular problems 
but rather to the process of inquiry itself. As such, they can and should serve as a 
reminder, both within the academy and beyond, of inquiry’s unending trajectory of 
questioning and revising, of the value of the individual mind in that process, and as 
encouragement for all to participate in the ongoing evolution of inquiry.  
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